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when trying to penetrate the
Mujahedeen—was very poor.
Even with the shortcomings mentioned,
this volume must be rated as one of the
best in providing a systematic analysis of
the Soviet armed forces on the tactical
level. In addition to twenty photographs
of soldiers and their weapons, there are
about thirty maps illustrating various
tactical operations. The translation from
Russian to English is excellent. The book
will be indispensable to students of mili-
tary tactics, as well as area specialists, as
its lessons continue to be pertinent to
conflict in Central Asia.
MILAN HAUNER
University of Wisconsin–Madison
Connaughton, Richard. MacArthur and Defeat in
the Philippines. New York: Overlook Press, 2001.
394pp. $35
In the dark days following the onset of
the Pacific War, American military suc-
cesses were few and far between. The gal-
lant, albeit unsuccessful, defense of the
Philippines, however, captured the na-
tional spirit and made General Douglas
A. MacArthur a national hero. His trium-
phant return to Manila three years later
seemed to confirm his status as a com-
mander of extraordinary military ge-
nius. Largely forgotten was his abortive
defense of the archipelago in 1941 that
ultimately led to the surrender of the
largest number of American troops in
history. In his prequel to The Battle for
Manila, British author Richard
Connaughton examines MacArthur’s
early campaigns and concludes that his
subject was a courageous general but a
deeply flawed man.
Connaughton begins his story with a
brief narrative outlining America’s in-
volvement in the Philippines since the
1880s, the same decade that witnessed
MacArthur’s birth. Switching gears, he
then follows MacArthur’s career from his
graduation from West Point in 1903
through his multiple tours in the Philip-
pines. Connaughton pays special atten-
tion to his subject’s activities in the years
immediately preceding World War II,
when MacArthur held the rank of field
marshal of the Philippine Common-
wealth. The MacArthur who emerges
during this period was the kind of mili-
tary planner whose strategic vision was
based on the enemy’s presumed inten-
tions rather than the foe’s capabilities.
When the Japanese attacked in December
1941, MacArthur’s defensive plans proved
hollow. Connaughton severely criticizes
MacArthur for allowing the destruction
of his air force on the ground at Clark
Field and speculates that MacArthur,
alone of the other senior Allied com-
manders who suffered defeat in the first
days of the war, was not sacked but pro-
moted to the temporary rank of general
because he was “untouchable both politi-
cally and militarily.” In his assessment of
MacArthur, Connaughton joins a grow-
ing number of historians who find fault
with the “Far Eastern General.”
Nor is Connaughton laudatory about
MacArthur’s static defense of Lingayen
Gulf, which he characterizes as “among
the most lackluster, uninspiring defenses
conducted throughout the duration of
World War II.” Within a week of the
Japanese amphibious assault at Lingayen
Gulf, MacArthur declared Manila an
open city and withdrew the majority of
his forces to the Bataan Peninsula and
the island fortress of Corregidor. Unfor-
tunately the garrison was ill equipped,
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and adequate logistical supplies to sup-
port a prolonged defense had not been
stored. The result was predictable—the
garrison was soon on half-rations that
sapped the strength of the defending
force during the subsequent campaign.
In the author’s view, as MacArthur ad-
vanced in seniority he increasingly be-
came the “victim of his own ego and
sense of infallibility, to the degree that he
could not accept that it was human to err
or to fail.” Especially critical of MacArthur’s
decision to retain overall command of
the Philippines from Australia,
Connaughton contends that MacArthur
deliberately misled the Army chief of
staff, George C. Marshall, about the ac-
tual number of Bataan’s defenders and
frequently dictated optimistic dispatches
that were belied by the deplorable condi-
tion of the defenders of Bataan and
Corregidor.
So where does Douglas MacArthur rank
among the great battle captains of the
world? Not very high, states Connaughton.
Citing with approval Roosevelt’s assess-
ment that MacArthur’s defense of Luzon
was more “criminal” than heroic, “more
a rout than military achievement,”
Connaughton concludes that MacArthur
avoided censure by maintaining the sup-
port of the Philippine government and
the Philippine people, and because the
removal of MacArthur by a Democratic
president would have generated political
backlash at a difficult time. Those factors,
coupled with MacArthur’s penchant for
public relations by which he created an
image of a lonely hero defending Amer-
ica on a distant shore, permitted MacAr-
thur to occupy a position in the Valhalla
of American military figures.
Douglas MacArthur has not fared well in
recent historiography of his unsuccessful
defense of the Philippines in 1941–42.
According to Connaughton, MacArthur
made “monstrous blunders” in directing
the defense of the archipelago. Strangely
enough, however, Connaughton con-
cludes with a more positive assessment,
suggesting that MacArthur arrived in
Australia a better soldier for having expe-
rienced defeat in the Philippines. From
Australia MacArthur would embark
upon a campaign that included eighty-
seven amphibious landings in his progress
toward ultimate victory and the liberation
of the island chain that had witnessed his
greatest defeat.
COLE C. KINGSEED
Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
New Windsor, New York
Campbell, R. Thomas. The CSS H. L. Hunley: Confed-
erate Submarine. Shippensburg, Penna.: Burd Street
Press, 2000. 173pp. $14.95
The Confederate vessel H. L. Hunley be-
came the first submarine to sink an op-
posing vessel in time of war when, on 17
February 1864, it detonated a spar tor-
pedo against the hull of USS Housatonic,
which was on blockade duty off
Charleston, South Carolina. The ship
sank in shallow water with a loss of five
lives. Hunley disappeared following the
explosion. The manner of its loss, the lo-
cation of the wreck, and the fate of the
crew have puzzled and challenged Civil
War buffs, historians, and underwater
archeologists for more than a hundred
years. Interest in the submarine intensi-
fied with the discovery of the vessel in
May 1995 and the raising of the wreck in-
tact in August 2000.
R. Thomas Campbell’s book The CSS
H. L. Hunley: Confederate Submarine
continues the popular fascination with
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